Daily Report from the Ukraine Field for 2022-06-28
News, Telegram, and Twitter Articles (Warning: Graphic)
How it started
How it’s going
🇷🇺🇺🇦 Opinion: Four months have passed.
Having refreshed what was said earlier (see on the tag) about the advantages and disadvantages, the following can be noted.
1. The war has become protracted, with both sides counting on achieving their goals militarily, expecting the enemy to break sooner (in this connection I express a timid hope that we already have a million sets of winter uniforms being sewn).
2. The stability of Ukraine as a state and the AFU as a military organization is largely determined by support from the West, and the transfer of weapons as such plays a third-priority role in this support - they are simply not enough to compensate for losses of the AFU. The primary role is played by fuel, ammunition, and money to support the financing of the army and other major items of government spending.
3 The Russian Armed Forces' tactics in this war rely on two pillars: the artillery offensive, relying on the ability to concentrate a much larger number of artillery systems and fire an order of magnitude more ammunition than the enemy, and the operational maneuvering under the artillery barrage.
4. To compensate for this superiority with Western supplies Ukraine has so far failed even taking into account the transfer of high-precision weapons - at least because Russia also has high-precision weapons and uses them in larger quantities than Ukraine can afford, although in much smaller quantities than would be desirable to speed up the process.
Some intermediate conclusions regarding the RF Armed Forces:
А. Army. The deployment of a large number of new units and formations in the Russian army after 2013 has not justified itself: the army does not have enough people to staff all the newly created/reconstructed formations according to the staff, while huge funds have been spent on capital construction for this mass of formations. It is clear that these new formations were conditioned by the events in Ukraine, but they were not sufficiently provided for. The situation when there are not enough men in the companies on the front line makes it difficult to act, given the numerical superiority of the enemy, even if you have more artillery and a lot more shells for it.
B. Fleet. If the fleet is not engaged in peacetime, if dubious ships are built according to strange designs without proper justification and goal setting, if restoration of technical readiness is passed off as repairs with modernization, if the process of combat training is profaned, and if commanders are turned into clerks filling out an endless number of papers - the consequences in wartime will not be long in coming, and they will be bad. We can also repeat once again about the crisis of goal-setting and the resulting system crisis of the Russian Navy as a whole, but it is a topic for a separate long conversation, to which we will certainly return in the near future. What is the Navy good at? "Kalibr and UKSC. It is very good, we go out on them and we will go out on them some more.
VKS. The Su-34 is a very good plane, the Ka-52 is probably the best attack helicopter in the world, but the range of modern precision-guided weapons for them needs to be expanded, and the fleet of special-purpose vehicles - ASW, reconnaissance, airborne reconnaissance aircraft and helicopters, whose development, unfortunately, is not a priority in our country - needs expansion and a radical upgrade, just like the tactics for countering air defense.
C. AIRBORNE FORCES. The existing structure of the Airborne Troops is inadequate to either the capabilities of airborne aviation or the conditions of combined arms combat. The former are not strong enough to lift and sustain the existing group, and the Airborne Troops have neither sufficient armor nor sufficient firepower for the latter. Apparently, the prospect lies in "airmobilization," the reduction of the airborne troops to airmobile/light infantry units that can be landed, operate using standard armored infantry units, and have additional training to conduct heliborne and tactical parachute assaults if necessary.🔻
🔺D. There is no sense in even repeating what has been said about drones.
Е. About the ground forces' fleet of armored vehicles, too.
❗️🇷🇺🇱🇹 Kaliningrad crisis, 🇬🇧EXPRESS reports:
Lithuania under 'major attack' from Russia after refusal to lift block of sanctioned goods
RUSSIA has launched a major cyber attack on Lithuania following its refusal to stop blocking goods from transiting to the enclave of Kaliningrad.
The Russian hacker group called Killnet said it will continue its major cyber attack on Lithuania as a direct response to Vilnius' decision to block the transit of some goods to Kaliningrad. The group claims it has already cut off 70 percent of Lithuanian internet infrastructure from the rest of the web, which it says took just 39 hours. The group tweeted: "At the moment, Lithuania is in sadder conditions than Kaliningrad. And we keep our promise!"
In an earlier tweet, the group had warned: "Let me explain on my fingers: - Web integration of Lithuanian websites and electronic systems is in the "Blockade", that is, "Geo block", web traffic and other means of communication are available only within the republic.
"Thus, we are disrupting Lithuania's network interaction with the rest of the world."
Lithuania's deputy Defence Minister Margiris Abukevicius said: "The main targets are state institutions, transport institutions, media websites."
A Killnet spokesperson has said that the attack will not stop until the blockade is lifted, warning that 1,652 web resources have already been demolished "just so far".
The group has also claimed to have crippled the websites of four airports in the country.
Schools and hospitals at risk of ATTACK as outdated tech leaves them open to cyber strikes
An expert has warned that UK schools, hospitals, and sports stadiums could all be at risk of attack due to "outdated tech".
Find out what the UK's vulnerabilities are and how you could be impacted HERE.
It said: "Thanks to our attacks, they are still available only from Lithuanian IP addresses, and their speed, to put it mildly, leaves much to be desired."
Now, it is urging Lithuania to lift the blockade.
The hackers said in a message sent via Telegram: "We continue to hint unequivocally to the Lithuanian authorities that they should immediately withdraw their decision to ban the transit of Russian cargo from the Kaliningrad region to Russia."
The enclave of Kaliningrad lies on the Baltic Sea and uses a rail link to Russia via Lithuania, which allowed Lithuania to ban the transit of steel and other ferrous metals under EU sanctions to the region.
But Lithuanian Prime Minister Ingrida Simonyte has said that Russia has made false claims about the blockade of its territorial outpost in the enclave.
She said: "Lithuania is complying with the sanctions imposed by the European Union on Russia for its aggression and war against Ukraine."
It came after EU sanctions on steel were slapped down in March, but a three-month transition period was allowed to so existing contracts were not ripped up.
Russian security council chief Nikolai Patrushev had earlier warned that the move would result in a "serious negative impact on the population of Lithuania".
Lithuania said it started to see the early signs of attack as early as June 21.
The country's National Cyber Security Centre has now warned in a statement the attacks will likely continue, not appearing to cave to the pressure to lift the blockade.
Jonas Skardinskas, its acting director, said: "It is very likely that attacks of similar or greater intensity will continue in the coming days, especially in the transportation, energy and financial sectors."
Now, other cyber attacks involving website defacements, ransomware, and other destructive measures are expected in the coming days.
In the west
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